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INTRODUCTION
This Note mounts a constitutional case against the recent amendment to
the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)' providing court-martial jurisdic-
tion over defense contractors and other civilians accompanying American
armed forces during contingency operations.' The amendment provides
extraordinarily expansive military jurisdiction, and it exceeds the constitutional
authority of Congress. This Note considers and rejects three potential authori-
Yale Law School, J.D. 2008. University of Oxford, DPhil, 2006. Special thanks to
Professor Akhil Reed Amar, Jaynie Rogers Randall Lilley, and Jane Lewis for com-
ments on previous drafts of this Note and to my husband, Steven Dionne, for his
constant support and encouragement.
1. lo U.S.C. §§ 8o-946 (2000).
2. Pub. L. No. 109-364, § 552, 120 Stat. 2217 (20o6) ("Paragraph (io) of section 802(a)
of title io, United States Code (Article 2(a) of the Uniform Code of Military Jus-
tice), is amended by striking'war' and inserting 'declared war or a contingency op-
eration.").
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ties for the measure: the Fifth Amendment, the Rulemaking Power, and the
War Powers. It finds grave objections arising from the plain text of the provi-
sions, materials illuminating the historical understanding of these words, and
the constitutional division of military authorities across the federal structure.
As the United States armed forces have become increasingly active in dip-
lomatic and military missions around the globe, they have become progressively
more reliant on a large population of accompanying civilians to provide protec-
tive, managerial, logistical, janitorial, and other services. A military census of
defense contractors at the end of 2006 counted nearly oo,ooo civilians support-
ing Operation Iraqi Freedom; this total rivaled the population of deployed ser-
vicemembers supporting that operation.' To put this number in historical
perspective, it represents a tenfold increase in contract jobs in the fifteen years
since Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. 4
Private military firms also represent an enormous economic force. Halli-
burton, the largest single private provider supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom,
"provides supplies for troops and maintenance for equipment under a contract
thought to be worth as much as $13 billion."5 This fee is
in current dollars... roughly two and a half times what the United
States paid to fight the entire 1991 Persian Gulf War, and roughly the
same as what it spent to fight the American Revolution, the War of
1812, the Mexican-American War, and the Spanish-American War
combined.6
To be sure, the current reliance on private military support is dramatic and un-
precedented.
Unfortunately, the private defense industry has become increasingly
prominent for reasons other than its growing size and monetary value; contract
employees have played a significant role in grave and disturbing instances of de-
tainee abuse, most infamously the Abu Ghraib prison scandal. 7 Blackwater
3. This figure does not include subcontractors, whose group size is not precisely
known. The servicemember population in 2006 consisted of approximately
140,000 troops. Renae Merle, Census Counts loo,ooo Contractors in Iraq, WASH.
POST, Dec. 5, 2006, at Di.
4. Id. These years represented a "rapid growth" of overseas operations and included
missions in Somalia, Haiti, Kuwait, Rwanda, and the Balkans. H.R. Rep. No. 1O6-
778, at 6 (2000).
5. P.W. Singer, Outsourcing War, FOREIGN AFF., Mar./Apr. 2005, at 123.
6. Id.
7. For more information on the troubling issue of detainee abuse, see John Sifton,
United States Military and Central Intelligence Agency Personnel Abroad: Plugging
the Prosecutorial Gaps, 43 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 487 (2006); David S. Cloud, Carla
Anne Robbins & Greg Jaffe, Red Cross Found Widespread Abuse of Iraqi Prisoners,
WALL ST. J., May 7, 2004, at Al (revealing contents of a confidential Red Cross re-
port provided to the Bush Administration detailing instances of prisoner abuse at
various sites in Iraq); The File: Prison Abuse, S.F. CHRON., June 20, 2004, at A17 (re-
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USA, a substantial private security firm, became the subject of federal investiga-
tions when its employees shot and killed seventeen Iraqi civilians while provid-
ing protective services in September 2007. These are, of course, the highest pro-
file problems, but, with a population as large as the current contractor
community, there are also more typical transgressions such as assaults and rob-
beries.'
These incidents raise the pressing question of how federal authorities
should manage and control the contractor population. Much ink has been
spilled in search of the answer; in the light of the unprecedented size of the
group and highly-publicized scandals, most recent efforts have been devoted to
discerning the most effective disciplinary tool. The sharp focus on immediate
pragmatic concerns, however, has obfuscated more fundamental issues. In par-
ticular, the constitutional status of and powers over accompanying civilians
have gone largely unexamined, 9 leaving open basic questions about the bounda-
ries of contractors' rights as civilians and the military's authority over contrac-
tors in the field. This Note attempts to remedy these shortcomings by illuminat-
ing the constitutional dimensions of the dilemma and offering a documentarian
rebuttal to the extension of court-martial jurisdiction over civilian contractors.
vealing allegations of abuse at sites in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Guantanamo Bay).
Regarding Abu Ghraib in particular, in early May 2004, several newspapers re-
ported that a February 2004 army publication revealed that employees of Titan
Corp. and CACI International, both American defense contractors, may have par-
ticipated in the abuse. See, e.g., Joel Brinkley & James Glanz, Contractors in Sensi-
tive Roles, Unchecked, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2004, at A15; Joel Brinkley & James Glanz,
Contract Workers Implicated in February Army Report on Prison Abuse Remain on
the Job, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2004, at A6; Iraq Prison Staff Seen as Issue, L.A. TIMES,
Apr. 30, 2004, at A7; Ellen McCarthy, CACI Wants to Review Report on Alleged
Abuse, WASH. PosT, May 4, 2004, at A18; Renae Merle, Titan Promises Cooperation,
WASH. PosT, May 8, 2004, at A16.
8. For an excellent recent discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of private
military firms, see Katherine Jackson, Not Quite a Civilian, Not Quite a Soldier:
How Five Words Could Subject Civilian Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan to Mili-
tary Jurisdiction, 27 J. NAT'L ASS'N L. JUDICIARY 255, 258-63 (2007).
9. At the time of writing, there are two published articles concerning the expansion
of court-martial jurisdiction over civilians during hostile military missions: Wil-
liam C. Peters, On Law, Wars and Mercenaries: The Case for Courts-Martial Juris-
diction over Civilian Contractor Misconduct in Iraq, 2006 BYU L. REV. 367; and
Jackson, supra note 8. The Peters article argues for the exercise of court-martial ju-
risdiction over civilians in time of war and includes hostile contingency opera-
tions such as Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom in that
category without treating the fundamental constitutional problem that these mis-
sions are not declared wars. The Jackson article reaches the same basic conclusion
as this Note regarding the constitutionality of the John Warner National Defense
Authorization Act for the Fiscal Year 2007 Amendment (DAB), but it offers an ex-
clusively doctrinal analysis of the issue without original or fresh attention to con-
stitutional problems.
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Historically, a limited application of the military law has been the answer to
the contractor accountability problem. For many hundreds of years, govern-
ments have subjected non-enlisted persons joining their forces in the field to
military laws and court-martial jurisdiction.' ° At its inception, the United States
chose to do the same on the basis of the Code of Gustavus Adolphus and the
British Articles of War." After the Constitution was ratified, Congress derived
general authority to make rules for the armed forces from Article I, Section 8,
Clause 14 ("the Rulemaking Power")'2 and a more specific permission to except
the military from the ordinary civilian justice system from the Fifth Amend-
ment.'3 Congress promulgated rules subjecting all accompanying civilians to
military jurisdiction during wartime and civilians accompanying armed forces
stationed outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States to military ju-
risdiction also during peacetime. 14 Congress continued this tradition when it
consolidated the rules of the various armed forces into the UCMJ in 195o.' Arti-
cle 2(10) covered "in time of war, all persons serving with or accompanying an
armed force in the field," and Article 2(11) covered the same population when
outside the U.S. territories also in peacetime.'"
10. WILLIAM B. AYCOCK & SEYMOUR W. WURFEL, MILITARY LAW UNDER THE UNI-
FORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE 3-15 (1955).
11. Id. at 9; WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 97-100 (2d ed.
1920). Colonel Winthrop's book, originally published in 1886, is considered the au-
thoritative military law treatise. Winthrop was a Deputy Judge Advocate General
in the Army. He once served as the assistant to the first Judge Advocate General
(General Holt), and he later authored the Annotated Digest of Opinions of the
Judge Advocate General. Military courts continue to cite his work.
12. "The Congress shall have the power ... [t]o make rules for the government and
regulation of the land and naval forces...." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
13. "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in
the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or
public danger.... U.S. CoNsT. amend. V. See also AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S
CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 330 (2005) ("While expressly exempting the mili-
tary only from the ordinary civilian system of pretrial indictments, the [Fifth]
amendment also implicitly recognized that military justice more generally could
be governed by a distinct set of procedures across the board; thus, military trials
themselves have traditionally operated outside the ordinary Article III rules gov-
erning judges and juries.").
14. See, e.g., 1 Stat. 95-96 (1789); 2 Stat. 359 (1806). See generally AYCOCK & WURFEL,
supra note lo, at 13 (tracing the evolution of the American military law from the
Articles of War promulgated in 1789 to the passage of the Uniform Code of Mili-
tary Justice in 1950).
15. Pub. L. No. 81-5o6, 64 Stat. 1O9 (codified as amended at lo U.S.C. §§ 801-946
(2000)). See also H.R. 2498, 81st Cong. (1949); H.R. 4080, 81st Cong. (1949), S. 857,
81st Cong. (1949).
16. Codified at lo U.S.C. § 802(a)(1o)-(a)(11) (2000).
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This statutory scheme was in tension with constitutional pronouncements
from the Supreme Court; since at least the mid-nineteenth century, the Court
had found unconstitutional military trials of civilians where civilian courts re-
mained available. 7 In Reid v. Covert8 and McElroy v. United States ex rel.
Guagliardo,'9 the Court struck down Article 2(11) and held that the Rulemaking
Power did not allow military jurisdiction over accompanying civilians overseas
during peacetime.2" Although the Court has observed that the congressional
War Powers are broader than the Rulemaking Power,2' the Court has not com-
mented on the boundaries of Article 2(10), the Fifth Amendment permission, or
court-martial jurisdiction over accompanying civilians during wartime.
As a statutory matter, however, Article 2(a)(lo) was limited to formal
wars.2' This limitation severely circumscribed military jurisdiction over accom-
panying civilians because the United States has formally declared war only five
17. See, e.g., Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946); Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4
Wall.) 2 (1866).
18. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
19. 361 U.S. 281 (196o).
20. Reid involved a military dependent (a soldier's wife), 354 U.S. at 3, and Guagliardo
involved a defense contractor, 361 U.S. at 282.
21. Reid, 354 U.S. at 33 n.59.
22. This limitation is based on the plain language of the statute ("in time of war"),
which has animated the case law. See United States v. Averette, 19 C.M.A. 363
(1970). In Averette, a court-martial convicted a defense contractor stationed in
Vietnam of conspiracy to commit larceny. The contractor challenged the exercise
of military jurisdiction on appeal, and a divided panel of the Court of Military
Appeals held that Article 2(a)(1o)'s specification of "in time of war" required a
formal declaration of war. The narrowness of the Supreme Court's view counseled
the "strict and literal construction of the phrase 'in time of war."' In the alterna-
tive, the court worried, civilians could face court-martial "whenever military ac-
tion on a varying scale of intensity occurs." Averette, 19 C.M.A. at 365. Although
the court acknowledged that the Vietnam conflict was a war in the traditional
sense of the word, the court refused to allow that understanding to substitute for a
formal declaration "at least in the sensitive area of subjecting civilians to military
jurisdiction." Id. at 365-66. Averette controlled subsequent inquiries until Congress
amended the UCMJ. The Court of Military Appeals cited it twice: first, in Zamora
v. Woodson, 19 C.M.A. 403 (1970), to dismiss charges against a civilian which were
pending review by a court-martial under Article 2(a)(1O) and, second, in Willen-
bring v. Neurauter, 48 M.J. 152, 157 n.4 (1998), for the proposition that "in time of
war" requires a formal declaration by Congress. The Army Court of Military Re-
view cited Averette numerous times. See, e.g., United States v. Singleton, 15 M.J. 579,
582 (A.C.M.R. 1983); United States v. Moss, 44 C.M.R. 298, 301 (A.C.M.R.
1971);United States v. Grossman, 42 C.M.R. 529, 530 (A.C.M.R. 1970). Finally, the
Fifth Circuit cited Averette in Cole v. Laird, 468 F.2d 829, 831 n.2 (5th Cir. 1972), and
the Court of Claims discussed Averette in Robb v. United States, 456 F.2d 768, 770-
72 (Ct. Cl. 1972).
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times in its history.23 Since World War II, the United States has had extensive
involvement in complex, protracted, and hostile diplomatic and military opera-
tions overseas. All this time, however, has technically been peacetime, so the
prohibition against court-martialing accompanying civilians has been in effect.
Unfortunately, this framework left a substantial accountability deficit for
civilians accompanying the military overseas. Regular federal criminal jurisdic-
tion did not have the extraterritorial reach to provide for prosecution of crimes,
and, without a formal declaration of war, the military could not prosecute
crimes under Article 2(lo) either. As a result, dependents and contract employ-
ees accompanying the armed forces faced few, if any, legal consequences for
criminal behavior.
In 2000, Congress attempted to provide a disciplinary apparatus by passing
the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA).2 4 The MEJA extended fed-
eral criminal jurisdiction to accompanying civilians who commit crimes when
(and only when) the host country does not exercise domestic criminal jurisdic-
tion. 5 The MEJA aimed to "provide overseas commanders with a new tool to
solve the rare, but previously vexing, issues of dealing with serious criminal
misconduct by civilian personnel who cannot be tried under the UCMJ." 26 To
that end, the MEJA authorized special pretrial procedures for the exercise of
federal criminal jurisdiction abroad, including procedures allowing accused
persons to appear before federal magistrate judges by telephone and to receive
defense counsel from the Judge Advocate General ranks. 7
The MEJA did not effectively address the accountability deficit,"s and the
reality of few MEJA prosecutions and no military jurisdiction effectively pre-
served contractors' immunity from criminal liability. As Peter Singer wrote in
2003:
[N]ot one private military contractor has been prosecuted or punished
for a crime in Iraq (unlike the dozens of U.S. soldiers who have), de-
spite the fact that more than 20,000 contractors have now spent almost
two years there. Either every one of them happens to be a model citi-
23. The War of 1812, the Mexican-American War, the Spanish-American War, World
War I, and World War II.
24. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261-67 (2000 & Supp. 2007).
25. Technically, the MEJA creates a new offense, which is essentially the extraterrito-
rial commission of any act that would be a crime if committed within the territo-
rial jurisdiction of the federal courts. See id.
26. Andrew D. Fallon & Capt. Theresa A. Keene, Closing the Legal Loophole? Practical
Implications of the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000, 51 A.F. L. REv.
271, 271 (2001).
27. 18 U.S.C. § 3265 (2000 & Supp. 2007).
28. See infra notes 88-94 and accompanying text.
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zen, or there are serious shortcomings in the legal system that governs
them.2 9
In response to this problem, the lo9th Congress and President Bush quietly
but dramatically asserted military jurisdiction over accompanying civilians.
Nestled deep in the Fiscal Year 2007 Defense Authorization Bill (DAB),3" an
amendment sponsored by Senator Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) 31 (the DAB
Amendment) subjects accompanying civilians to the UCMJ not only during de-
clared wars but also during "contingency operations."32 A contingency opera-
tion is a military operation that:
(A) is designated by the Secretary of Defense as an operation in which
members of the armed forces are or may become involved in military
actions, operations, or hostilities against an enemy of the United States
or against an opposing military force; or
(B) results in the call or order to, or retention on, active duty of mem-
bers of the uniformed services under [this Code] or any other provi-
sion of law during a war or during a national emergency declared by
the President or Congress.3
This definition may include any hostilities that the Secretary of Defense de-
clares it to include. Traditionally, the moniker has applied not only to hostilities
abroad, such as Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom
(both of which the bill specifies by name),3 4 but also to foreign peacekeeping
and relief efforts.35 Because the definition covers national emergencies, it may
also encompass domestic crises involving reserve components like the National
Guard.36
29. Singer, supra note 5, at 127.
30. DAB, Pub. L. No. 109-364, 120 Stat. 2217 (20o6).
31. Senator Graham served as an Air National Guard attorney, and he is an Air Force
Reserve Judge. For Senator Graham's biography, see Senator Graham's official
website. United States Senator Lindsey Graham, http://lgraham.senate.gov (last
visited Oct. 24, 2008).
32. DAB, § 552, 120 Stat. 2217 (2006) ("Paragraph (io) of Section 802(a) of title io,
United States Code (article 2(a) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice), is
amended by striking 'war' and inserting 'declared war or a contingency opera-
tion."').
33. lo U.S.C. § loi(a)(13) (2000).
34. DAB, § 355, 120 Stat. 2162 (2006).
35. Examples include Operation Uphold Democracy (Haiti), Operation Restore Hope
(Somalia), Operation Support Hope (Rwanda), Operations Joint Endeavor, Joint
Guard and Joint Forge (former Yugoslavia), and Operation Strong Support (hur-
ricane relief in Centra, America).
36. The National Guard has been deployed for events such as the L.A. riots, Hurricane
Andrew in 1992, the Great Flood of 1993 along the upper Mississippi River, the
Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, the September ith terrorist attacks in 2001, Op-
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The DAB Amendment represents a major shift in legal accountability for
civilian military personnel. The MEJA subjected them to regular federal crimi-
nal procedures and causes of action, complete with the regular complement of
due process protections. The DAB Amendment, however, subjects them to the
more extraordinary military justice system of courts-martial, which has a lim-
ited set of procedural protections. Whereas the MEJA attached only when host
countries decline jurisdiction, the DAB Amendment applies at the discretion of
the Secretary of Defense.37 This shift brings with it a host of related procedural
eration Winter Freeze (a border patrol operation) in 2004-2005, and severe winter
weather events and wildfires in 2007.
37. The military courts are extraordinary for two primary reasons. First, they involve
a broader category of substantive criminal law than do civilian courts. The UCMJ
criminalizes failure to behave as an officer and a gentleman, disrespect toward sen-
ior officers, cruelty toward subordinates, damaging military property, and drunk-
enness on duty. See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 750 (1974) ("[The UCMJ] regulates
a far broader range of the conduct of military personnel than a typical state
criminal code regulates the conduct of civilians...."). Second, the UCMJ provides
a more limited set of procedural protections than do the Constitution and statutes
that govern civilian courts. The UCMJ provides a military accused many rights
which are analogous to the entitlements of a civilian defendant, including the
rights
to be informed of the charges against him; to cross-examine witnesses for
the Government; to challenge members of the court for cause or
peremptorily; to have a specified number of members compose general
and special courts-martial; to be represented by counsel; not to be
compelled to incriminate himself; to have involuntary confessions
excluded from consideration; to have the court instructed on the
elements of the offense, the presumption of innocence, and the burden of
proof; to be found guilty of an offense only when a designated number of
members concur in a finding to that effect; to be sentenced only when a
certain number of members vote in the affirmative; and to have an
appellate review.
United States v. Clay, i C.M.A. 74, 77-78 (1951). The UCMJ diverges from the civil-
ian criminal law in crucial ways. The system of military trials has "traditionally
operated outside the ordinary Article III rules governing judges and juries."
AMAR, supra note 13, at 330. Defendants do not enjoy the regular complement of
constitutional due process guarantees; they are not entitled to trial by jury, and,
when juries ("panels") are used, they are composed of military servicemembers,
not civilians. Justice Black wrote of courts-martial in Reid:
In essence, these tribunals are simply executive tribunals whose personnel
are in the executive chain of command. Frequently, the members of the
court-martial must look to the appointing officer for promotions, advan-
tageous assignments and efficiency ratings-in short, for their future
progress in the service. Conceding to military personnel that high degree
of honesty and sense of justice which nearly all of them undoubtedly
have, the members of a court-martial, in the nature of things, do not and
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concerns; for example, the availability of witnesses-particularly expert wit-
nesses-is extremely limited in courts-martial abroad and more readily avail-
able in domestic civilian trials.
This extraordinary measure was not nearly as well publicized as the prob-
lem that provoked it,"s and the military has just recently prosecuted the first
case.3 9 Apparently, only one military law scholar squarely supports the exten-
sion of court-martial jurisdiction as the preferred solution to contractor immu-
nity.4° Most of the commentary either raises or mollifies practical concerns
about the reach of the DAB Amendment. On the one hand, the provision, if
applied broadly, could precipitate difficulties because of the breadth of behav-
iors that are criminalized by military law. On the other hand, some experts and
contractors contend that this provision will have few significant consequences.
Concerns about military prosecution for minor infractions may be exaggerated
cannot have the independence of jurors drawn from the general public or
of civilian judges.
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 36 (1957).
38. When the Senate passed the DAB Amendment in June 2006, no major news or-
ganization reported the change. The only media account of the amendment was
the wire publication of Senator Graham's press release, which detailed the juris-
diction-expanding provision as one of three recent accomplishments in the Sen-
ate. Press Release, Graham Pushes Health Care, Retirement, Chain of Command
Changes in Senate Bill, http://lgraham.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction
=PressRoom.PressReleases&ContentRecord-id=97c9869-OABO-4003-946D
-78161B5B7426&Regionid=&Issue-id= (last visited Dec. 12, 2008). When Presi-
dent Bush signed the DAB into law in October 20o6, no major news organization
reported the change. Finally, on November 3, 20o6, the Bulletin News Network ran
a 181-word White House Bulletin. Military Can Now Court-Martial Civilian Con-
tractors in Iraq, Other Hot Spots, Bulletin News Network, Inc., Nov. 3, 2006. The
first major news organization to report the amendment was the Boston Globe,
which ran a story in January 2007. Farah Stockman, Contractors in War Zones Lose
Immunity: Bill Provision Allows Military Prosecutions, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 7, 2007,
at A13. Eventually, a web article by Peter Singer, a Brookings Institution Fellow and
military law expert, caught the attention of the news outlets. See Posting of P.W.
Singer to www.DefenseTech.org, http://www.defensetech.org/archives/oo3123.html
(Jan. 3, 2007, 17:37 EST). To date, there appears only one on-point academic arti-
cle: Jackson, supra note 8.
39. The test case involves the court-martial of a dual Iraqi-Canadian citizen, Alaa
Mohammed Ali, who was employed as an Army translator in Iraq and allegedly
stabbed a fellow contractor during a fight. See Slobodan Lekic, Iraqi Contractor
Charged Under New Law, SFGATE, Apr. 5, 2008, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?f=/n/a/20o8/o4/o5/international/io3362D5o.DTL; Posting of Dan
Slater to WSJ LawBlog, http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2oo8/o4/1O/ (Apr. lO, 2008, 11:44
EST).
40. See Peters, supra note 9.
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and unlikely to come to pass.4' One prominent defense contractor has argued
that most civilians in Iraq are not, for statutory purposes, "accompanying the
forces" or supporting the military mission because they participate in construc-
tion and development work, not direct conflict assistance.42 As the Blackwater
incident revealed, this detail may turn out to be a significant limitation on the
reach of the amendment. 43 The DAB Amendment may also be unnecessary to
the extent that, in conflict zones, problems may be handled by transferring or
removing contractors, not holding hearings or pressing charges. Of course, Abu
Ghraib seems to refute this particular trivialization. Indeed, the recurrence of
high profile scandals may mean that any mechanism for punishing contractors
will become increasingly attractive to law enforcement officials. At the very
least, such scandals create a strong public pressure to bring perpetrators to jus-
tice, and the DAB Amendment supplies a powerful new device for pursuing that
goal.
The focus on practical worries has meant that serious constitutional prob-
lems with the expansion of court-martial jurisdiction have gone largely unex-
amined.44 It is apparent at first glance that the DAB Amendment is in tension
with contractors' constitutional rights to a jury trial. The reach of those rights
and the boundaries of the exception for the military justice system in the Fifth
Amendment, however, are less clear. The other relevant constitutional provi-
sions that empower Congress raise additional thorny issues. Given the reality
that the military regularly engages in protracted and large-scale hostilities with-
out formal declarations of war, may Congress extend military jurisdiction over
accompanying civilians under the Rulemaking Power? If not, are contingency
operations sufficiently like formal wars such that Congress may claim War
Powers authority for the DAB Amendment?45 Does either provision establish
authority for depriving contractors of the jury trial guarantee? If there is a Fifth
Amendment concern and neither the Rulemaking Power nor the War Powers
empower Congress to allow the Executive to court-martial civilians supporting
hostile missions, grave constitutional defects attach.
This Note takes a documentarian approach to these questions. The docu-
mentarian approach combines the textual, historical, and structural methods of
41. See, e.g., William Matthews, New Law Subjects Contractors to Military Justice, FED.
TIMES, Jan. 15, 2007, available at http://www.federaltimes.com/index.php?S=
2464127.
42. Fawzia Sheikh, Uncertainty Still Surrounds Application of UCMJ Law to Contrac-
tors, 19 INSIDE THE ARMY 9, 2007.
43. John M. Broder & James Risen, Armed Guards in Iraq Occupy A Legal Limbo, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 20, 2007, at Al; Alissa J. Rubin & Paul von Zielbauer, The Judgment
Gap in a Case Like the Blackwater Shootings, There Are Many Laws but More Obsta-
cles, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2007, at Al.
44. See Peters, supra note 9.
45. Article 1, Section 8, Clause 11 provides Congress's War Powers.
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constitutional interpretation. 46 Although each method is conceptually self-
contained, their common roots in the constitutional script mean that they need
not be mutually exclusive where, as here, none is sufficient to answer a particu-
lar question. Rather, there is a strong argument for employing the methods to-
gether: "The American People ratified the Philadelphia Constitution not clause
by clause, but as a single document. ' '47 At its best, documentarian analysis
"braid[s] arguments from text, history and structure into an interpretive rope
whose strands mutually reinforce." 4s
The core advantage of privileging documentarian analysis over doctrinal
analysis of judicial precedent is that documentarian analysis considers argu-
ments and materials that have not yet figured into the doctrine because the doc-
trine emerged from different facts, is old, or both. As a result, documentarian
analysis offers and examines a wider range of arguments regarding a question,
whereas doctrinal analysis places more emphasis on predicting the outcome of a
question on the basis of previous judicial decisions. 49
Nevertheless, this Note considers the relevant jurisprudence where docu-
mentarian analysis has animated the case law. It also makes a special effort to
indicate where the doctrine seems to have diverged from the Constitution. To
be clear, however, this Note treats judicial doctrine as a secondary source. The
46. Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court 1999 Term, Foreword: The Document and the
Doctrine, 114 HARv. L. REV. 26, 26 & n.2 (2000-2001) ("[Documentarians] seek in-
spiration and discipline in the amended Constitution's specific words and word
patterns, the historical experiences that birthed and rebirthed the text, and the
conceptual schemas and structures organizing the document."). The textual
method privileges the plain text of the Constitution, and it seeks to resolve ques-
tions of constitutional law by understanding the plain meaning of the words. Rea-
soning from history attempts to understand constitutional provisions in the light
of records and materials that illuminate their intended meaning. The structural
method privileges the structure of the government created by the Constitution,
and it resolves questions of constitutional law by reference to the relationships the
Constitution creates between and among branches, governments, and officials.
For the classic explication of this last method, see CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUC-
TURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969). For an explanation of
different interpretive methodologies, see PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE
(1982).
47. Amar, supra note 46, at 29. See also id. at 26 & n.2 (endorsing the documentarian
approach as a combination of methods); BLACK, supra note 46, at 31 ("[S]o long as
we continue to look on our Constitution as a part of the law applicable in court,
just so long the work of sheer textual interpretation will be a great part-probably
the greatest part--of judicial work in constitutional law. There is ... a close and
perpetual interworking between the textual and the relational and structural
modes of reasoning, for the structure and relations concerned are themselves cre-
ated by the text, and inference drawn from them must surely be controlled by the
text.').
48. Amar, supra note 46, at 31.
49. For a thorough doctrinal analysis of the DAB Amendment, see Jackson, supra note 8.
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Constitution controls the analysis directly. A thorough doctrinal analysis of the
question has been presented elsewhere.50
This Note concludes that military jurisdiction over accompanying civilians
during contingency operations conflicts with contractors' civilian rights and ex-
ceeds the constitutional authority of Congress. It rejects Fifth Amendment,
Rulemaking Power, and War Powers authority for the DAB Amendment
because it finds intractable constitutional difficulties in reconciling the DAB
Amendment with the text, structure, and history of these provisions. In the
light of these flaws, this Note suggests that improved departmental use of fed-
eral criminal jurisdiction under MEJA presents a preferable solution to the im-
mediate accountability deficit.
This Note proceeds in two parts. Part I provides a brief history of legal ac-
countability for civilians accompanying the armed forces, and Part II examines
the constitutionality of the DAB Amendment in the context of its three key pro-
visions.
I. A SHORT HISTORY OF LEGAL ACCOUNTABILITY FOR ACCOMPANYING
CIVILIANS
The United States has always subjected certain accompanying civilians to
military laws and court-martial jurisdiction. The "first Articles of War drafted
on American soil for American troops" were the Massachusetts Articles of War,
which the Provisional Congress of Massachusetts Bay adopted on April 5, 1775.5
The Thirty-first Article provided: "All sellers and retailers to a camp, and all
persons whatsoever serving with the Massachusetts Army in the field, though
not enlisted Soldiers, are to be subject to the Articles, Rules and Regulations of
the Massachusetts Army."52 Mere months later, the First Continental Congress
enacted the first American Articles of War with a nearly identical Article. 3 Sub-
sequent national Articles included equivalent language. 4
50. See id.
51. AYCOCK & WURFEL, supra note io, at 9.
52. Reprinted in WINTHROP, supra note ii, app. at 947, 950. Sellers, retailers, and per-
sons serving with the army in the field typically included officers' servants, camp-
followers, newspaper correspondents, telegraph operators, civilian clerks, team-
sters, laborers, hospital officials and attendants, veterinaries, interpreters, guides,
scouts, spies, railroad operators, etc. Id. at 98-99.
53. See American Articles of War of 1775, art. XXXII, reprinted in WINTHROP, supra
note ii, app. at 953, 956.
54. See American Articles of War of 1776, § XIII, art. 23, reprinted in WINTHROP, supra
note ii, app. at 961, 967; American Articles of War of 18o6, § I, art. 60, reprinted in
WINTHROP, supra note ii, app. at 976,981; American Articles of War of 1874, art. 63,
reprinted in WINTHROP, supra note 11, app. at 986, 991.
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After the Philadelphia Constitution was ratified, Congress derived authority
to promulgate military laws from Article I, Section 8, Clause 14.11 For more than
150 years, these laws consisted of the Articles of War for the Army and Articles
for the Government of the Navy for the Navy and Marine Corps. In 1949, be-
cause the rapidly increasing size of the armed forces during World War II pre-
cipitated an explosion in the number of courts-martial, 6 Congress passed legis-
lation consolidating these laws into the UCMJ and establishing a single court-
martial system covering all of the United States Armed Forces.5 7 President Tru-
man signed the UCMJ into law on May 5, 1950. Article 2(10) provided for court-
martial jurisdiction over accompanying civilians in time of war, and Article
2(11) covered accompanying civilians when outside the U.S. territories in peace-
time. 8 Although the UCMJ comfortably passed congressional muster59 and
President Truman hailed it as "tangible evidence of the achievements possible
by the coordinated teamwork of [the forces],"6" the provisions for military ju-
risdiction over civilians were the subject of some concern. Multiple witnesses at
congressional hearings expressed principled and pragmatic concerns about
military jurisdiction over civilian populations.61
55. "The Congress shall have the power... to make rules for the government and
regulation of the land and naval forces." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl.14. To be clear,
the Constitution's grant of authority to Congress to establish the court-martial
system is entirely separate from its establishment of the judicial power in Article
III. See Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (2o How.) 65, 75 (1857). As a result, it is a "basic le-
gal proposition" that "the court-martial system is a separate jurisdiction wholly
apart from the civil federal judiciary." AYCOCK & WURFEL, supra note lo, at 15.
56. See BRENT G. FILBERT & ALAN G. KAUFMAN, NAVAL LAW: JUSTICE AND PROCE-
DURE IN THE SEA SERVICES 14 (3d ed. 1998).
57. Pub. L. No. 81-5o6, 64 Stat. 1O9 (codified as amended at lo U.S.C. §§ 8O-946
(2000)). See also H.R. 2498, 81st Cong. (1949); H.R. 4080, 81st Cong. (1949); S. 857,
81st Cong. (1949).
58. Codified at lo U.S.C. § 8o2(a)(lO), (11) (2006).
59. H.R. 4080 passed the Senate 62-9. 96 CONG. REC. 1412 (1950). The House did not
take a roll call vote.
60. Harry S. Truman, Statement by the President upon Signing Bill Establishing a
Uniform Code of Military Justice, May 5-6, 1950, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/
ws/index.php?pid=13466 (last visited Dec. 12, 2008).
61. See, e.g., Uniform Code of Military Justice: Hearing on H.R. 2498 Before the H.
Comm. on Armed Servs., 81st Cong. 768 (1949) (statement of Richard L. Tedrow,
Esq.) (advocating "severely" limiting jurisdiction over civilians by providing it
only "where there are actual wartime operations going on"); id. at 817 (statement
of Robert D. L'Heureux, Chief Counsel, Senate Banking and Currency Committee
and former Judge Advocate General attorney) (expressing concern that the provi-
sions extending jurisdiction over civilians were too broad); Uniform Code of Mili-
tary Justice: Hearings on S. 857 and H.R. 4080 Before the S. Comm. on Armed Ser-
vices, 81st Cong. 256 (1949) (statement of Maj. Gen. Thomas H. Green, Judge
217
YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW
The political hesitations percolated against a backdrop of legal reluctance;
historically, the Supreme Court had very narrowly interpreted military jurisdic-
tion over civilians. On primarily textual and historical grounds, the Court was
particularly hostile to the use of military justice systems to try civilians where
civilian courts remained available. In the landmark 1866 case Ex Parte Milligan,
the Court refused to allow a military commission to try an American civilian
when a civilian court (in his home state of Indiana) was available to try him. 62
The Court relied on the plain text of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments,
as well as an extensive historical analysis of the supremacy of civil law over mar-
tial law rooted in those provisions. 63 It concluded that "[o]ne of the plainest
constitutional provisions was.., infringed" when Milligan was court-martialed
and denied a jury trial. 64 In Duncan v. Kahanamoku, the Court disallowed mili-
tary trials of civilians in Hawaii while it was under martial law after the attack
on Pearl Harbor and declared that civilian courts were unjustifiably shut.65 The
Court described a wealth of pre-Revolutionary and American historical evi-
dence that "the founders of this country are not likely to have contemplated
complete military dominance" of civil law.66 The Court added a complementary
observation on the structure of American government, finding that
"[1legislatures and courts are not merely cherished American institutions; they
are indispensable to our government. Military tribunals have no such stand-
ing."167
After the UCMJ took effect, the Court continued to restrict peacetime mili-
tary jurisdiction over accompanying civilians. In Toth v. Quarles,6 s the Court
restricted the exercise of military jurisdiction over veterans. The Air Force
court-martialed Toth after his honorable discharge for a crime he allegedly
committed during his service in Korea.69 Toth challenged his conviction in a
habeas proceeding, and the Court held that neither the text nor the structure of
the Constitution permitted such expansive military jurisdiction, which "neces-
sarily encroaches on the jurisdiction of federal courts set up under Article
111 ...- 70
Advocate General of the Army) (expressing concern that the provisions extending
jurisdiction over civilians were too broad and likely to incite "public revulsion").
62. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
63. Id. at 119-21.
64. Id. at 122.
65. 327 U.S. 304 (1946).
66. Id. at 322.
67. Id.
68. 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 15.
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Although Toth tested the applicability of the UCMJ to veterans rather than
accompanying civilians, it remains significant evidence of the commitment of
the Court to a narrow view of the congressional Rulemaking Power and to the
subordination of the military to civilian authority. The Toth Court offered a
general pronouncement: "Determining the scope of the constitutional power of
Congress to authorize trial by court-martial presents another instance calling
for limitation to 'the least possible power adequate to the end proposed.'"' Known
as the "Toth doctrine," this commitment has controlled subsequent questions of
congressional authority to extend military jurisdiction during peacetime.72
Shortly after Toth, the Court struck down Article 2(11) on textual, historical,
and structural grounds in Reid v. Covert.73 A court-martial convicted Mrs. Cov-
ert of killing her husband, an Air Force serviceman, on an air base where they
lived in England, and she appealed to the federal courts. The Court held that,
because she could not fairly be said to be "in" military service, she should not
lose her jury trial right and that the Rulemaking Power did not authorize Con-
gress to allow military authorities to try her. The Court found no historical evi-
dence suggesting that due process guarantees should give way to the Rulemak-
ing Power and extensive precedent suggesting the opposite.7 4 The Court
reiterated the Framers' emphasis on subordinating the military to civilian au-
thorities: "The tradition of keeping the military subordinate to civilian author-
ity may not be so strong in the minds of this generation as it was in the minds of
those who wrote the Constitution."75 The Court also cited Colonel William
Winthrop's authoritative treatise.76
Crucially, the Court seemed to suggest that Reid might be limited to
dependents and thus left a door ajar regarding other accompanying civilians:
"[Tihere might be circumstances where a person could be 'in' the armed ser-
vices for purposes of Clause 14 even though he had not formally been inducted
into the military or did not wear a uniform."7 7 The DAB Amendment probes
this open question.
Three years later, the Court expanded the prohibition of peacetime military
jurisdiction over civilians, again, on textual and historical grounds. The Court
extended the rule of Reid against the exercise of military jurisdiction over de-
pendents to those accused of non-capital offenses 78 and the Court held that
military authorities could not constitutionally exercise jurisdiction over civilian
71. Id. at 23 (quoting Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 230-31 (1821)).
72. See, e.g., McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281, 286 (196o).
73. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
74. Id. at 19-40.
75. Id. at 23.
76. Id. at 35.
77. Id. at 22-23.
78. Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (196o).
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employees accused of crimes overseas.79 The crucial contractor case,
Guagliardo,8 ° involved two peacetime military prosecutions of accompanying
civilians: in the first, an electrical lineman was convicted by court-martial of lar-
ceny and conspiracy to commit larceny; in the second, an auditor was convicted
by court-martial of sodomy."s The reasoning was the same overlay of textual,
historical, and structural concerns as in Toth and Reid. The Court found no his-
torical precedent supporting court-martial jurisdiction over civilians assisting
peacetime operations, and, citing Col. Winthrop's treatise for the opposite
proposition, the Court held that court-martial jurisdiction over civilians during
peacetime violated the jury trial guarantee of the Constitution.82
Toth, Reid, Kinsella, and Guagliardo comprise a peacetime jurisprudence,
and the Court made clear that the congressional War Powers are broader than
the Rulemaking Power.s3 The Court expressly acknowledged the long-standing
tradition and practical reasons supporting military jurisdiction over civilians
accompanying armed forces during war.s4 This doctrine provides guidance on
the question of the constitutionality of military jurisdiction over accompanying
civilians during conflict, but it does not engage the issue precisely. United States
v. Averettes5 most recently considered that question, but a lower court resolved
it as a matter of statutory interpretation. The Court of Military Appeals held
that UCMJ's provision for military jurisdiction over civilians "in time of war"
provided jurisdiction only after a formal, congressional declaration of war.86 In
short, the Supreme Court doctrine is uncertain, at best, on the constitutional
aspects of the question the DAB Amendment raises.
Because so few overseas conflicts are technically wars, the federal govern-
ment since Averette has continued to struggle with how to hold accompanying
civilians accountable for criminal behavior. Over the years, seven pieces of legis-
lation were introduced in Congress, and none gathered enough support to be-
79. Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278 (196o) (holding with regard to civilian employees
accused of capital offenses while overseas), McElroy v. United States ex tel.
Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960) (holding with regard to civilian employees accused
of non-capital offenses while overseas).
80. Because the Court found no difference between civilian employees accused of
capital crimes while accompanying the military and dependants accused of the
same, it disposed of the other contractor case, Grisham, briefly and by virtue of
Reid. See Guagliardo, 361 U.S. at 283-84.
81. 361 U.S. at 282-83.
82. Id. at 284.
83. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 33-34 & n.59 (1957).
84. Reid, 354 U.S. at 33.
85. 19 C.M.A. 363 (1970).
86. Id. at 365.
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come law."7 In 1995, Congress directed the Departments of Justice and Defense
to study the problem jointly. The resulting task force recommended two juris-
dictional extensions: first, an extension of court-martial jurisdiction to accom-
panying civilians during contingency operations (essentially the DAB Amend-
ment) and, second, an extension of federal criminal jurisdiction to
accompanying civilians abroad (essentially the MEJA). The Departments sup-
ported only the MEJA-like solution, and it garnered support in Congress.
The MEJA's extension of federal criminal jurisdiction did not provide the
accountability mechanism that its drafters had hoped. This failure was for sev-
eral reasons. First, the statute left unspecified myriad logistical details, which
made it difficult to implement straightaway."8 Second, the statute only applied
to felonies and left some offenses uncovered. Third, the statute initially only
applied to Department of Defense affiliates and preserved the accountability
deficit for contractors of the Central Intelligence Agency, State Department, and
Department of the Interior. The Abu Ghraib prison scandal called attention to
this shortcoming, as early Justice Department interest in using the MEJA to
prosecute the perpetrators was thwarted when the media revealed that some of
the participating private contractors technically worked for the CIA and the
Department of the Interior.s9 As a result of this loophole, although the involved
soldiers were court-martialed, the contract employees were not prosecuted.90
Congress attempted to close this loophole in 2004 by extending the MEJA to
87. See S. 2083, 104th Cong. (1996); H.R. 5808, lo2d Cong. (1992); S. 147, 1Ost Cong.
(1989); H.R. 255, 99th Cong. (1985); H.R. 763, 95th Cong. (1977); S. 1, 94th Cong.(1975); S. 2007, 9oth Cong. (1967).
88. See Fallon & Keene, supra note 26, at 28o-91 (explaining the uncertainty regarding
whether military law enforcement may apprehend a civilian without encountering
posse comitatus problems, whether there will be a sufficient nexus between extra-
territorial criminal acts and the United States such that the application of Ameri-
can law would not offend the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, venue
rules under the MEJA, applicability of extradition treaties, and the right to defense
counsel).
89. See, e.g., Dan Eggen & Walter Pincus, Ashcroft Says U.S. Can Prosecute Civilian
Contractors for Prison Abuse, WASH. POST, May 7, 2004, at A18; Ellen McCarthy &
Renae Merle, Contractors and the Law: Prison Abuse Cases Renew Debate, WASH.
POST, Aug. 27, 2004, at Ei; Renae Merle & Ellen McCarthy, 6 Employees from CACI
International, Titan Referred for Prosecution, WASH. POST, Aug. 26, 2004, at A18;
Scott Shane, Some U.S. Prison Contractors May Avoid Charges; Interior Department
Hired Abu Ghraib Interrogators; Loophole Tangles Prosecution; Army Chain of
Command Blurred in Civilian Abuses, BALT. SUN, May 24, 2004, at ]A.
90. The only legal consequences for their alleged involvement came in the form of a
civil racketeering and Alien Tort Claims Act lawsuit filed by human rights
attorneys at the Center for Constitutional Rights in June 2004. See Second
Amended Class Action Complaint, Saleh v. Titan Corp., No. 04 CV 1143
(S.D. Cal. June 30, 2004), available at http://ccrjustice.org/files/Saleh-
SecondAmendedComplaint.pdf.
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employees and contractors of other federal agencies. 9' The amendments,
however, limited MEJA coverage to Defense Department missions abroad and
left a sizeable population of contractors supporting diplomatic missions with
yet another loophole.92 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the MEJA has
been ineffective in closing the accountability gap because the Justice
Department hesitated to exercise jurisdiction under the statute.93 In January
2007, it was reported that the federal government has not exercised MEJA
jurisdiction at all since 2000. 94
Currently, the DAB Amendment allows the military to exercise jurisdiction
during contingency operations, which are commenced upon the designation of
the Secretary of State or upon the declaration of a national emergency by the
President or Congress. At a minimum, this definition includes hostilities and
conflicts that may be popularly referenced as wars even though they are not
formal wars. At its broadest, this definition may mean the inclusion of foreign
peacekeeping and relief efforts, as well as domestic crises involving armed forces
reserve components. The DAB Amendment provides jurisdiction that is con-
current with Article III courts' jurisdiction. When contractors facilitating con-
tingency operations abroad misbehave, they are subject both to federal criminal
penalties under the MEJA (if the host country declines to exercise criminal ju-
risdiction) and military penalties under the UCMJ. 95 When contractors facilitat-
ing domestic contingency operations misbehave, they are subject both to regu-
lar criminal prosecutions and military laws.
This scheme is unprecedented, and it demands a constitutional analysis.
Such efforts are especially imperative in the light of limited doctrinal guidance
from the Supreme Court. To that end, Part II considers the textual, historical,
and structural arguments against the DAB Amendment.
91. Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Pub. L.
No. 1o8-375, 118 Stat. 1811 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3267(l) (a) (2oo6)).
92. See 18 U.S.C. § 3267(2)(a) (iii) (2006).
93. See Posting of Glenn Schmitt to NavyTimes.com, http://www.navytimes.com/
community/opinion/army-backtalk contractorso71126/ (Mar. 9, 2008) (explain-
ing that "[t] he Defense Department's position is that it is too busy fighting the war
to investigate the acts of contractors, even those who work directly for the mili-
tary. And the Justice Department takes the position that it will prosecute only
cases that the Defense Department refers to it."); see also Chris Lombardi, Law
Curbs Contractors in Iraq, A.B.A. J. E-REPORT, May 14, 2004, available at 3 No. 19
ABAJEREP1 (Westlaw).
94. Stephen Fidler & Demetri Sevastopulo, Civilian Workers Could Face US Courts
Martial, FiN. TIMES, Jan. 1o, 2007, at 6.
95. It is not yet clear how the Defense and Justice Departments will prosecute crimes
where they share jurisdiction. They are working to establish guidelines for how to
manage such situations.
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II. THE DOCUMENTARIAN CASE AGAINST SUBJECTING CIVILIANS TO MILITARY
JURISDICTION DURING CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS
A congressional power to extend court-martial jurisdiction to civilians sup-
porting contingency operations may emanate from one of two constitutional
provisions: either the Rulemaking Power provided by Article I, Section 8,
Clause 14, or the War Powers9 6 Therefore, defense contractors must be "in" the
armed forces for the purposes of Rulemaking Power (and thereby exempted
from the Fifth Amendment's guarantee), or contingency operations must be
close enough substitutes for formally declared wars to trigger the War Powers
and ameliorate the concern about implicating due process rights. In the latter
scenario, the congressional or executive authorizations of force and support
that approve such operations must be constitutionally acceptable substitutes for
a formal declaration of war. This Note considers each rationale in turn. It con-
cludes that both approaches invoke a notion of congressional power that is in-
compatible with the plain text of the Constitution (understood in the proper
historical context) and the structure of the government it provides.
A. No War Powers Authority: Contingency Operations Are Not Wars
The congressional War Powers emanate from Article I, Section 8, which
provides that Congress "shall have the power to ... declare war, grant letters of
marquee and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water;
96. More precisely, the question of military jurisdiction over accompanying civilians
concerns two kinds of constitutional provisions: those concerning rights (the Fifth
Amendment) and those concerning powers (the Rulemaking Power and the War
Powers). The text of the Fifth Amendment provides: "No person shall be held to
answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or in-
dictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the
militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger.... U.S. CONST.
amend. V (emphasis added). Normally, diligent documentarian analysis would
proceed with careful attention to core conceptual differences between kinds of
provisions. This analysis, however, cannot proceed as though the key provisions
are conceptually distinct because the language of the Rulemaking Power appears
to correlate to and align with the language of the Fifth Amendment guarantee;
both privilege membership in the services. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 22 ("Since
the exception in [the Fifth] Amendment for 'cases arising in the land or naval
forces' was undoubtedly designed to correlate with the power granted Congress to
provide for the 'Government and Regulation' of the armed services, it is a persua-
sive and reliable indication that the authority conferred by Clause 14 does not en-
compass persons who cannot fairly be said to be 'in' the military service."). That is,
the congressional rulemaking authority over the armed forces appears to extend
only as far as the exception from the Fifth Amendment guarantee (i.e., only to
those who are "in" the service). Congress has no authority to abridge the guaran-
tee where it applies. For these purposes, then, the rights/powers distinction col-
lapses into an inquiry as to who may be appropriately described as "in" the armed
forces, and the analysis of the question becomes about power.
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to raise and support armies... ; to provide and maintain a navy .. .,97 Partly
because these powers are among the most expansive provided to Congress and
partly because the Rulemaking Power speaks only to the regulation of the forces
(not civilians),98 the War Powers provide the basis for court-martial jurisdiction
over civilians during wartime.99 In order for Congress to invoke the War Pow-
ers now to provide court-martial jurisdiction over civilians during contingency
operations, contingency operations must be the equivalent of, or at least a good
substitute for, a formally declared war. Indeed, reliance on the War Powers to
justify extraordinary government action outside of war would seem an imper-
missible aggrandizement of those powers. This Part contends that such war-
contingency operation equivalence is textually, historically, and structurally im-
possible to sustain.
The prevailing view assumes that the constitutional grant of War Powers is
meant to regulate a certain class of activities identifiable by practical, task-based
characteristics and widespread public perception. On this logic, conflicts be-
come wars when soldiers are fighting and when the public and media begin to
refer to them as wars. This reasoning supposes that, in practice, the choice be-
tween war and peace is not binary but may be fairly represented along a contin-
uum. This is not how the Constitution conceives of the choice. Even conceding
that the War Powers are among the government's broadest powers, the DAB
Amendment remains too broad in light of the relevant documentarian con-
cerns. Contingency operations are not the constitutional equivalent of wars.
First, a contingency operation gains its status either from designation by
the Secretary of Defense or from the declaration of a national emergency by
Congress or the President,' °0 while a war gains its status only by declaration
from Congress."' This difference is constitutionally substantial: While elected
representatives of the people control the use of the designation "war," an un-
97. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8.
98. Clause 14 provides "The Congress shall have power... to make rules for the gov-
ernment and regulation of the land and naval forces... " Id.
99. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 33 & n.59 (1957) ("To the extent that [cases upholding
military trial of accompanying civilians during time of war] can be justified, inso-
far as they involved trial of persons who were not 'members' of the armed forces,
they must rest on the Government's 'war powers."').
1oo. 10 U.S.C. § lol(a)(13) (2000).
1O. This Note does not engage the extensive debate over whether Congress or the
President controls the ability to make war. Rather, it focuses on the significance of
the ability to declare war. It proposes, on the basis of Article I, Section 8, that Con-
gress must "declare" a war in order for it to exist as a formal, legal matter. See also
William Michael Treanor, Fame, the Founding, and the Power To Declare War, 82
CORNELL L. REV. 695, 698 (1997) (citing historical materials suggesting that at the
time of the founding, "[tihe phrase 'declare war' had a fixed meaning in interna-
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representative executive official may unilaterally control the use of the label
"contingency operation." At the very least, the idea that a single official ap-
pointed by the President may, by mere designation, subject tens of thousands of
civilians to martial law runs afoul of the explicit delegation by the Constitution
to Congress to designate war. On a broader reading, the DAB Amendment's re-
liance on executive discretion runs counter to the reservation by the Constitu-
tion of declaratory authority to a representative and deliberative body.
Either way, "none doubt that Congress must vote to declare war if America
is to declare it.""0 2 This power may not be placed in the hands of a single official.
Whatever authority to commit American troops to hostilities the executive may
claim, the text expressly delegates to the legislature the power to designate a
conflict as a war. On pain of repetition, to be clear, this fact does not necessarily
mean that Congress must declare war for a conflict to be constitutional; the
point is much more limited. It is that, if a conflict is to be a war for the purposes
of setting aside constitutional guarantees, the Constitution specifies that Con-
gress must designate it so.
Even those who generally place little or no emphasis on a congressional
declaration of war share the view that this formality is necessary to set aside civil
liberties. For example, Professor John Yoo has argued for a broad view of the
executive's authority to make war. He has suggested that a congressional decla-
ration is not necessary for large-scale hostile military operations to proceed
against an enemy or to preserve the authority of Congress vis-A-vis the author-
ity of the President,' 3 but he has specified that a congressional declaration re-
mains essential to preserving limits on the powers of the government against
citizens:
One important area where a declaration of war remains significant is
domestic civil liberties. The Supreme Court has held as constitutional
certain deprivations of liberties in wartime only because a declaration
of war has been issued; in fact, one of the rights in the Bill of Rights can
only be suspended during wartime. The declaration of war plays an
important role in limiting the power of the federal government as it af-
fects citizens, but it does not perform that function with regard to the
executive branch.0 4
This insistence that a congressional declaration is essential to set aside civil lib-
erties in the name of war does not permit the substitution of executive designa-
tions for the legislative formality.
Furthermore, contingency operations cannot constitutionally substitute for
wars because the Constitution reserves wars as extraordinary events, or, at least,
102. W. TAYLOR REVELEY III, WAR POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS 171
(1981).
103. See JOHN Yoo, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE (2005).
104. Interview by Univ. of Chi. Press with John Yoo, Professor of Law, Univ. of Cal.
Berkeley Sch. of Law (Aug. 25, 2008), available at http://www.press.uchicago.edu/
Misc/Chicago/96o315in.html.
225
YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW
significantly more extraordinary than contingency operations. "War" typically
refers exclusively to hostilities, while "contingency operation" may include not
only hostilities but also a wide variety of other circumstances. In 1997, the De-
fense Department described its participation in contingency operations:
Over the past decade, the United States has conducted an array of ma-
jor contingency operations of the following types: peace operations,
disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, noncombatant evacuation,
maritime escort, counterterrorism, reprisals, deterrence of aggression,
intervention to support democracy, sanctions enforcement, no-fly zone
enforcement, migrant rescue and support, search and rescue, and de-
ployments to quell domestic civil disturbances." 5
Consequently, contingency operations are qualitatively and quantitatively
different from wars. The qualitative point is that there is a fundamental differ-
ence between a war and a rescue mission, or a war against an enemy and a de-
ployment to quash civil unrest. The one typically involves a threat to interests of
the United States, while the other needs no such trigger or justification. The
quantitative point is that the definition of contingency operation includes many
more missions than the definition of war has historically encompassed. Con-
gress has only declared five wars in the history of the United States, but the fed-
eral government has designated more than ten times that number of contingency
operations since 1991.106 For example, just in 1996,
[C]ontingency operations included crisis response in the Persian Gulf
and Taiwan Straits; humanitarian relief and peace operations in the
former Republic of Yugoslavia; enforcement of the no-fly zone over
southern Iraq; humanitarian relief in northern Iraq; and noncombat-
ant evacuations from Liberia and the Central African Republic." 7
These differences are by design; only extraordinary and unusual events
were meant to qualify as wars. William Michael Treanor has argued that, at the
time of the founding, "declare war" referred to the exclusive authority of Con-
gress to designate a war, meaning "to classify a conflict as a war for legal pur-
105. 1997 DEF. DEP'T. ANN. REP., http://www.dod.mil/execsec/adr97/chap2.html (last
visited Dec. 12, 2008).
io6. Letter from GAO to James Inhofe, Chairman, S. Subcomm. on Military Read-
iness and Mgmt. Support (July 6, 2000), http://www.gao.gov/archive/2ooo/
nsoo164.pdf ("Since the end of the Persian Gulf War in 1991, U.S. Armed Forces
have been involved in more than 50 contingency operations abroad."). During the
Bush Administration, these have included Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation
Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan), and Operation Noble Freedom (U.S. military
bases worldwide). Clinton Administration contingency operations included Op-
eration Uphold Democracy (Haiti); Operation Restore Hope (Somalia); Opera-
tion Support Hope (Rwanda); Operations Joint Endeavor, Joint Guard and Joint
Forge (former Yugoslavia); and Operations Provide Comfort II, Southern Watch,
and Northern Watch (Southwest Asia).
107. 1997 DEF. DEP'T. ANN. REP., supra note 1O5.
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poses;" he has further argued that the Framers appreciated that few hostilities
would achieve such status. ' James Madison described war as "among the
greatest of national calamities,"' °9 and Publius remarked on the rarity of formal
war."' Also, the young United States participated in several hostilities that were
not sufficiently involved, protracted, or costly to become formal wars."' Never-
theless, the Framers chose the congressional declaration, rather than any quali-
tative measure, as the hallmark of a formal war. At the very least, then, the
Framers understood war as atypical and grave.
The historical evidence lends some support to a stronger claim that the
Framers desired to preserve formal war as rare and that this preference animated
the design of the constitutional structure of government. That the Framers
chose the congressional designation to distinguish wartime from peacetime in
the light of the foregoing historical materials has led some scholars to draw this
inference; John Hart Ely has argued that the Framers empowered only Congress
to declare war expressly to "reduce the number of occasions on which we would
become... involved" in war and to achieve their wish that "peace would... be
the customary state of the new republic."". Others have relied on evidence sug-
gesting that the Framers delegated the ability to declare war to Congress out of a
concern that political temptations might make the executive too likely to be too
bellicose."3 The worry was that an ambitious or fame-seeking President might
be more likely to take the country to war than would the more populous, delib-
erative, and representative legislature. Madison, at least, articulated this con-
cern.1 4 Regardless of whether one agrees only with the milder argument that the
lO8. Treanor, supra note iol, at 698.
109. JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY 3 (1993) (citing remarks by Madison at
the Federal Convention of 1787).
11o. THE FEDERALIST No. 25 (Alexander Hamilton).
ill. See Treanor, supra note ioi, at 724 ("[B]efore it was twenty-five years old, [the
United States] had engaged in a series of wars with Native Americans; launched
military actions against the Barbary states; and fought the world's two most for-
midable military powers [including] France, in the undeclared naval 'Quasi-War'
of 1798 to 1800 ...."); see also ELY, supra note lo9, at 3 (noting that "most [wars]
weren't [declared]" at the time of the founding); Louis Fisher, Historical Survey of
the War Powers and the Use of Force, in THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND THE POWER
TO Go TO WAR 11, 14-15 (Gary M. Stern & Morton H. Halperin eds., 1994) (describ-
ing early engagement in undeclared wars).
112. ELY, supra note lo9, at 3.
113. See William Michael Treanor, The War Powers Outside the Courts, in THE CONSTI-
TUTION IN WARTIME 156 (Mark Tushnet ed. 2005); Treanor, supra note iol.
114. Madison wrote:
In no part of the constitution is more wisdom to be found than in the
clause which confides the question of war or peace to the legislature, and
not to the executive department .... (T]he trust and the temptation
would be too great for any one man: not such as nature may offer as the
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Framers understood formal war to be rare or endorses the stronger claim that
they structured the federal government to make war extraordinary, it is clear
that the Framers envisioned war and the related powers as exceptional.
The substitution by the DAB Amendment of contingency for war cannot be
reconciled with this vision. A War Powers rationale for the amendment at-
tempts to trigger the great War Powers while avoiding the exacting require-
ments of the Constitution for declaring war; it elevates contingency operations
to war status without obtaining the necessary endorsement of the elected repre-
sentatives of the people. The DAB Amendment invokes the War Powers to gov-
ern a class of regular and frequent military missions instead of exercising that
enormous authority specifically and with discretion. This regime is the antithe-
sis of the Constitution's treatment of war as extraordinary and entered only by
Congress. Contingency operations cannot constitutionally substitute for wars,
and the War Powers cannot authorize the DAB Amendment.
This conclusion grows stronger when domestic contingency operations,
such as hurricane relief efforts, are considered. These operations are qualita-
tively even more unlike wars than are the complicated, hostility-wrought over-
seas missions, and their inclusion in the comparison increases the quantitative
gulf between the ever-growing practice of engaging in contingency operations
and the extremely rare practice of declaring war. The inclusion of domestic re-
lief operations sharpens the contrast between wars and contingency operations,
accentuates the inability of contingency operations to substitute for declared
wars constitutionally, and heightens the fragility of the War Powers rationale
for the DAB Amendment. Even if, as a practical matter, it is unlikely that the
military would exercise court-martial jurisdiction over civilians supporting do-
mestic relief missions, the permission of the DAB Amendment for the military
to do so remains unsound.
Nevertheless, advocates of court-martialing accompanying civilians might
attempt to save the DAB Amendment from these objections. They could posit
that, because Congress authorizes appropriations for large-scale contingency
operations (and perhaps even authorizes the use of military force generally),
such legislative action is declaration enough. On this reasoning, congressional
resource commitments indicate a legislative appreciation of large-scale hostili-
prodigy of many centuries, but such as may be expected in the ordinary
successions of magistracy .... It is in war, finally, that laurels are to be
gathered, and it is the executive brow they are to encircle. The strongest
passions, and most dangerous weaknesses of the human breast; ambition,
avarice, vanity, the honorable or venial love of fame, are all in conspiracy
against the desire and duty of peace.
James Madison, "Helvidius" Number 4, in 15 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON
io6, io8 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1985); see also Letter from James Madison
to Thomas Jefferson, Apr. 2, 1798, in 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 312-13
(G. Hunt ed. 19o6) ("The Constitution supposes, what the history of all govern-
ments demonstrates, that the executive is the branch of power most interested in
war, and most prone to it. It has accordingly with studied care, vested the ques-
tion of war in the legislature.").
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ties and secure the participation of the legislature in the "war"-making decision.
Such authorizations simply are not declarations of war. Contingency operations
remain contingency operations because a majority of congresspersons, for
whatever reason, has not assigned them the exceptional "war" designation. The
core documentarian problem remains.
In the simplest terms, the War Powers cannot justify the expansion by the
DAB Amendment of military jurisdiction because contingency operations are
not and cannot be wars. Contingency operations are fundamentally different
from wars. Wars are meant to be among the most extraordinary of events, not
peacekeeping, rescue, or humanitarian missions. The Constitution reserves the
ability to declare that a conflict is a war to the deliberations of Congress, not to
the discretion of the President or his appointed officials. However hostile, pro-
tracted, or complex, contingency operations are not wars because Congress has
not declared them wars. Contingency operations cannot legitimately trigger the
War Powers. The War Powers cannot provide authority for giving the executive
blanket discretion to court-martial civilians during any military operation it
designates.
B. No Rulemaking Authority: Defense Contractors Are Not in the Armed Forces
The congressional ability to regulate the military also cannot provide such
authority. The Rulemaking Power arises out of Article I, Section 8, Clause 14,
which states: "The Congress shall have power.., to make rules for the govern-
ment and regulation of the land and naval forces.. ." 5 This language suggests
that Congress can only provide for military jurisdiction over the land and naval
forces, not accompanying civilians who are not part of the forces.
The text of the Rulemaking Power is properly read as contemplating only
two populations: civilian and military. There is no place for a third, hybrid
group that is sometimes civilian and sometimes military. Historically, defense
contractors have been considered as serving "with," not "in" the armed forces.
All armed forces regulations in place during colonial times, the Founding, and
America's early years contemplated "sellers and retailers to a camp" and regu-
lated "all persons whatsoever serving with [the continental army] in the field.""' 6
These individuals were never addressed as "in" the forces; they were always re-
ferred to as serving "with" the forces. The unwavering discipline of this lan-
guage signifies the rigidity of the legal distinction. Although contractors and
soldiers perform similar, related tasks and may be in similar danger, similarity
and proximity are not circumstances that transform a civilian into a member of
the forces for the duration of the conflict.
115. U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 14.
116. See, e.g., American Articles of War of 1775, art. XXXII, reprinted in WINTHROP,
supra note 11, app. at 956; American Articles of War of 1776, § XIII, art. 23,
reprinted in WINTHROP, supra note ii, app. at 967; American Articles of War of
1806, § I, art. 60, reprinted in WINTHROP, supra note 11, app. at 981; American Arti-
cles of War of 1874, art. 63, reprinted in WINTHROP, supra note 11, app. at 991.
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This reading of the Rulemaking Power is supported by and is consistent
with the Fifth Amendment, which also distinguishes the military and the civil-
ian classes. The Fifth Amendment provides, in relevant part, "[n]o person shall
be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a pre-
sentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or
naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public
danger.... .""I On its face, the exception is limited to cases arising in the forces.
According to Col. Winthrop, the historical understanding of this exception for
those "in" the forces is that it does not pertain to any civilians:
[The Fifth Amendment] clearly distinguishes the military from the civil
class as separate communities. It recognizes no third class which is part
civil and part military-military for a particular purpose or in a par-
ticular situation, and civil for all other purposes and in all other situa-
tions-and it cannot be perceived how Congress can create such a
class, without a disregard of the letter and spirit of the organic law."'
In light of the historical understanding of these provisions, they appear to con-
template the ways in which civilian contractors are like soldiers and reject those
similarities as the basis for legal equivalence.
This interpretation is the only interpretation that is consistent with the
other relevant Constitutional provisions: Article III, Section 2,"9 the Fifth
Amendment,12 and Sixth Amendment.2 These provisions are sweeping, as they
reference "all crimes," "no person," and "all criminal prosecutions." They can-
not be squared with a reading of the Rulemaking Power that would allow some
crimes and some criminal prosecutions of civilians to be tried by a court-martial
without a jury. They are particularly incompatible with a reading of the Rule-
making Power that would permit such exceptions at the discretion of the Secre-
tary of Defense.
Rather, having confronted the jury trial guarantee, the congressional Rule-
making power must give way. The jury trial is among the most fundamental
and precious entitlements guaranteed by the Constitution. Fervent colonial ob-
jection to adjudication by unrepresentative imperial officers and British denial
of jury trials had been a root cause of the Revolution. 2 Jury trial guarantees
117. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
118. WINTHROP, supra note ii, at io6.
119. "The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury; and such
trial shall be held in the state where the said crimes shall have been committed;
but when not committed within any state, the trial shall be at such place or places
as the congress may by law have directed.' U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
120. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
121. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed...." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
122. See AMAR, supra note 13, at 233-34; see also THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
para. 20 (U.S. 1776).
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featured prominently in all post-independence governance texts. 23 The jury
trial guarantee was so essential that "[e]very state that penned a constitution be-
tween 1775 and 1789 featured at least one express affirmation of the jury trial,
typically celebrating the jury with one or more of the following words: 'ancient,'
'sacred,' 'inviolate,' 'great,' and 'inestimable." 1 4 The jury trial guarantee has
been referred to as "[t]he dominant strategy to keep agents of the central gov-
ernment under control" 12 5 and a "paradigmatic image underlying the Bill of
Rights." ' 6 Of special importance to the DAB Amendment analysis, the jury trial
guarantee was particularly precious in the case of criminal trials. Leonard Levy
has determined that this guarantee was the "only right secured in all state con-
stitutions penned between 1776 and 1787. '1117 As a result, "Article III sensibly laid
down a uniform federal rule.., that also tracked [the] unanimous consensus of
American states .... 8
It seems difficult to overstate the importance of the jury trial guarantee in
the light of the wealth of historical materials amplifying the textual emphasis of
it. There is no historical or other evidence that the congressional Rulemaking
Power is of equal importance. In a clash between the Rulemaking Power and
the jury trial guarantee, it is the former that must yield. The text of the Rule-
making Power cannot be stretched far enough to permit Congress to abridge
the jury trial guarantee for a growing population of civilian military personnel
merely by amending a spending bill.
The DAB Amendment offends more constitutional provisions than the
Fifth Amendment guarantees to civilians; the DAB Amendment also trans-
gresses the exception in the Fifth Amendment to the grand jury requirement for
cases arising in the armed forces. This exception is specifically provided for
cases arising in the forces, not cases "connected to," "related to," or "because
of" the forces. Mere connectedness cannot be sufficient to convert the parties
from civilians to military servicemembers and thereby remove the case from ci-
vilian courts. Such a drastic conversion (and implication of the Sixth Amend-
ment and Article III) cannot be accomplished so implicitly.
In his authoritative treatise on military law, Col. Winthrop describes how
statutes extending court-martial jurisdiction to certain civilians (discharged of-
ficers) during peacetime might be saved from constitutional objections such as
these by reference to the dual powers of the Rulemaking Power and the con-
123. See U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2; U.S. CONsT. amends. V, VI; AMAR, supra note 13, at 234
("Every state constitution after independence contained multiple guarantees of
jury trial.").
124. See AMAR, supra note 13, at 330.
125. Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, ioo YALE L.J. 1131, 1183 (1991)
(emphasis added).
126. Id. at 119o.
127. LEONARD LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 227 (1985) (emphasis added).
128. AMAR, supra note 13, at 234.
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gressional power to "raise armies."'2 9 The argument is that, "notwithstanding"
that former officers "have become civilians," such statutes place them "in the
army for a temporary or special purpose, and, by the same act, provid[e] for
their government while so placed... so that their offences shall be punishable
as 'cases arising in the land forces."""0 As Col. Winthrop points out, however,
even assuming that Congress can place individuals in the armed forces by mere
declaration,' the basic documentarian problems remain. To reiterate, these in-
clude: the historical objection, outlined above, that civilians serving with the
army in the field have always been considered with, not in, the forces; the con-
flict with the jury trial guarantee of the Sixth Amendment; and the conflict with
the Rulemaking Power and the separation by the Fifth Amendment of military
from civilian procedures. Arguments that contractors are "far more characteris-
tic of a 'soldier' than of a 'civilian"" 2 miss the point that the Constitution nei-
ther provides nor contemplates such a continuum. The expanded Rulemaking
Power argument fails.
Others argue that the Necessary and Proper Clause saves expansive military
jurisdiction from constitutional objections.3 3 The government took this posi-
tion in Reid. The argument was that the two Clauses provide a "broad grant of
authority 'without limitation' authorizing Congress to subject all persons, civil-
ians and soldiers alike, to military trial if 'necessary and proper' to govern and
regulate the land and naval forces." 134 This pairing, however, does not overcome
the textual problem. The Court said that the Necessary and Proper Clause could
not extend the Rulemaking Power beyond the class described in its terms: the
"land and naval forces."' 35 Justice Black also rejected this reading on structural
grounds as conflicting with the Bill of Rights because the reading would bring
the Rulemaking Power into conflict with the Fifth Amendment guarantee of in-
dictment by a grand jury and the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a jury trial.36
For these reasons, the DAB Amendment cannot be justified with reference to
the Rulemaking Power and the Necessary and Proper Clause.
Although this analysis is sufficient to resolve the question, there is an addi-
tional reason to reject the Necessary and Proper Clause approach: military ju-
risdiction over accompanying civilians is definitively unnecessary for effective
129. See WINTHROP, supra note ii, at 105-o6.
130. Id.
131. Judicial doctrine suggests otherwise. See id. at 1o6.
132. Peters, supra note 9, at 410.
133. "The Congress shall have power to ... make all laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers
vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States or in any de-
partment or officer thereof." U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
134. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 20 (1957).
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regulation of the armed forces. Because the MEJA provides for the prosecution
of accompanying civilians in domestic civilian courts, it is a solution for the ac-
countability deficit to which the DAB Amendment purports to respond.
Whether the Department of Justice utilizes the solution optimally is immaterial
for the purposes of the constitutional analysis; its availability undoes any neces-
sity rationale for the DAB Amendment. In the case of domestic contingency op-
erations, the availability of regular federal criminal prosecution renders military
jurisdiction unnecessary. The Necessary and Proper Clause, therefore, cannot
supplement the rulemaking authority to provide military jurisdiction over civil-
ians supporting contingency operations.
In summary, the textual and historical objection to a Rulemaking Power ra-
tionale for the DAB Amendment is quite comprehensive. It draws not only on
the text of the Clause, but also on other portions of Article I, Article III, the Bill
of Rights, and materials illuminating the importance of the guarantees provided
therein.
In light of the breadth of this documentarian objection to the DAB
Amendment, it is unsurprising that the objection is consonant with the juris-
prudential hostility to military trials of civilians. Constitutional concerns ani-
mated the Toth doctrine of limiting the Rulemaking Power to "the least possible
power adequate to the end proposed."'3 7 Justice Black's opinion for the Reid
majority provided an extensive textual and historical explanation for the
Court's insistence that military dependents living on bases overseas be tried by
civilian courts.' 8 The core of the Reid reasoning is that the Sixth Amendment
evinces a colonial experience filled with distrust of military rule and martial law,
and this experience caused the Framers to place special importance on civilian
law courts and trials by jury. Justice Black cites the complaints in the Declara-
tion of Independence that King George III had "affected to render the Military
independent of and superior to the Civil Power" and "deprive[ed] [colonists],
in many cases, of the benefits of trial by jury."' 39 He also leans heavily on the
fact that, in the Framers' lifetime, "the right of the military to try soldiers for any
offenses in time of peace had only been grudgingly conceded."'14 On this basis,
Justice Black concludes that the Framers cannot have intended to allow Con-
gress to deny the jury trial guarantee merely by "making rules" for the armed
forces under Article I, Section 8, Clause 14. This reasoning has controlled subse-
quent cases.' 4'
Reid, however, briefly diverges from its own documentarian conclusion. In
limiting the case to its facts, Justice Black expressly clarified that other accom-
panying civilians might be different from dependents: "[Tlhere might be cir-
137. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 23 (1955).
138. The textual analysis is at Reid, 354 U.S. at 19-20. The historical analysis follows.
139. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 14, 20 (U.S. 1776).
140. Reid, 354 U.S. at 23.
141. See McElroy v. U.S. ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281, 283-84 (196o).
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cumstances where a person could be 'in' the armed services for the purposes of
Clause 14 even though he had not formally been inducted into the military or
did not wear a uniform.1 142 Indeed, it might seem that if Justice Black is correct
that the text leaves the door ajar for a non-military individual to come under
the ambit of the Rulemaking Power, a defense contractor accompanying forces
engaged in a hostile operation would have to qualify. The distinction between
peacetime and wartime is not as neat in practice as it is in the Constitution. Fur-
thermore, American forces are regularly and increasingly committed to hostili-
ties that are not understood as wars and to hostilities that are popularly under-
stood as wars but that are not formal wars. As a result, one could argue that,
even in the light of the foregoing textual analysis and historical materials, civilians
who are accompanying the armed forces during bellicose hostilities and subject
to all of the typical exigencies of the battlefield should be considered "in" the
armed services.
This argument fails for two reasons. First, it seems as though Justice Black
cannot be correct in this regard. If the words of the Constitution are to be given
their plain meaning, people who are not members of the military cannot be "in"
the armed forces for the purposes of the Rulemaking Power. In the Justice's
own words:
The Constitution does not say that Congress can regulate 'the land and
naval forces and all other persons whose regulation might have some
relationship to maintenance of the land and naval forces.' There is no
indication that the Founders contemplated setting up a rival system of
military courts to compete with civilian courts for jurisdiction over ci-
vilians who might have some contact or relationship with the armed
forces. Courts-martial were not to have concurrent jurisdiction with
courts of law over non-military America.143
If this analysis is correct, then there can be no population not in the armed
forces that may be reached with the Rulemaking Power.
Even if Justice Black is correct that the Rulemaking Power may reach some
military affiliates, however, it cannot reach contractors for historical reasons.
Because soldiers were not even subject to court-martial jurisdiction for civil
crimes committed during wartime at the time the Constitution was drafted, the
Constitution cannot possibly accommodate congressional attempts to subject
civilians to military jurisdiction during contingency operations. Only in 1863
did Congress authorize the trial of soldiers by court-martial for the crimes of
murder, manslaughter, arson, rape, robbery, and larceny.144 Prior to 1863, ser-
vice members who committed such crimes were tried in state courts;' 45 the cir-
cumstances of the Civil War necessitated swifter and more effective disciplinary
142. Reid, 354 U.S. at 23.
143. Id. at 30 (emphasis added).
144. 12 Stat. 731, 736 (1863).
145. See Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U.S. 509, 514 (1879).
234
27:20S 2008
"IN TIME OF WHENEVER THE SECRETARY SAYS"
mechanisms. Furthermore, Congress only extended court-martial jurisdiction
over soldiers for civil crimes during wartime by using its War Powers; it may
not now use its lesser Rulemaking Powers to extend military jurisdiction over
civilians for crimes committed during contingency operations. It seems that
such a reach would inevitably offend the Constitution as originally understood
and constructed.
In short, the practical reality that current periods are neither wartime nor
peacetime does not undo the documentarian case against expanding military
jurisdiction over civilians. Rather, in the light of the text, historical materials,
and jurisprudence they animate, the suggestion that the Rulemaking Power
might reach some nonmilitary individuals seems untenable. Nevertheless, even
if the speculation contrariwise in Reid is engaged, there is no historical support
for an argument that the Rulemaking Power can reach defense contractors sup-
porting contingency operations abroad.
Structural problems complement the textual and historical constitutional
objection to a Rulemaking Power rationale for the DAB Amendment. The sim-
plest structural difficulty is that, if civilians accompanying forces engaged in
contingency operations are "in" the armed services for the purposes of the
Rulemaking Power, there is little (if any) difference between the congressional
regulatory powers and the War Powers. Indeed, the ability to use the Rulemak-
ing authority to provide for court-martial jurisdiction over both the civilian and
the military classes enables Congress to achieve the same result as it could by
declaring war; Congress would declare martial law over a group of civilians. In
this way, the vision of the Rulemaking Power that underlies the DAB Amend-
ment effectively equates peacetime and wartime police powers over accompany-
ing civilians. That enables Congress to abridge civil liberties when it would oth-
erwise be powerless to do so.
Proponents of the DAB Amendment might respond that as long as Con-
gress remains the decider, the constitutional structure remains undisturbed.
This argument misses the mark. It is insufficient that Congress is the key actor
because the Constitution does not recognize all congressional actions as being
the same. As articulated above, there are qualitative differences between a des-
ignation of a contingency operation and a declaration of war.14' 6 The DAB
Amendment allows Congress to gain advantages that are appropriately re-
stricted to the more exacting mechanism. This permission is inconsistent with
the constitutional structure of congressional authorities.
The collapse of distinct congressional powers is also inconsistent with the
careful division in the Constitution of military authority.147 While Congress has
the power to declare war, the President is the Commander in Chief. Further-
more, while Congress has the power to appropriate funds for military spending,
146. See supra Section II.A.
147. See generally AMAR, supra note 13, at 117-19 (explaining the Constitution's limita-
tion on military powers).
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the President "superintend[s] actual disbursements."' 4 In addition to the clear
horizontal balance, there is an implied vertical balance, as state militias would
be able, at least in theory, to respond in the event of an attempted national
coup. 4 9 The Framers' concern that the military be kept subordinate to civilian
authorities animated these measures, and the Constitution guards its War Pow-
ers carefully. This effort to preserve "freedom from fear of our own military"
cannot abide the extension of martial law over civilians by mere congressional
rulemaking; the one is the antithesis of the other. °
A further structural difficulty arises because the DAB Amendment subjects
civilians to military jurisdiction when civilian courts remain open. This scheme
overlays the Rulemaking Power with the Article III judicial power and violates
the Constitution's separation of the two powers. Traditionally, the military jus-
tice system has operated entirely separately from the federal judiciary.5 ' Courts-
martial are agencies of the executive, "provided by Congress for the President as
Commander-in-chief," not inferior courts; they serve "to aid him in properly
commanding the army and navy and enforcing discipline therein," not to im-
pose criminal liability pursuant to the traditional rule of law. 2 The two disci-
plinary systems are, by design, unconnected and with different purposes. By
providing court-martial jurisdiction over accompanying civilians where federal
criminal jurisdiction already exists thanks to the MEJA, the DAB Amendment
upsets this structure. A military justice system tailored to exerting control ends
up conflicting with a civilian system committed to due process.
This structural objection has animated judicial doctrine. By giving courts-
martial "concurrent jurisdiction with courts of law over non-military America,"
the DAB Amendment precipitates precisely the outcome that Justice Black
found objectionable in Reid; it upsets a careful balance between martial and
civil law.'5 3 The Supreme Court has held since Ex Parte Milligan 54 that the
constitutional structure of government does not allow military trials where
civilian courts remain available.
148. Id. at 115.
149. See id. at 118.
150. Id. at 119.
151. See generally WINTHROP, supra note 11, at 49 (explaining that courts-martial are
not a part of the judiciary but an agency of the executive department provided by
the Congress).
152. Id. See also Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (2o How.) 65, 79 (1857) ("Congress has the
power to provide for the trial and punishment of military and naval offences in
the manner then and now practiced by civilized nations; and ... the power to do
so is given without any connection between it and the 3d article of the Constitu-
tion defining the judicial power of the United States; indeed ... the two powers
are entirely independent of each other.").
153. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 30 (1957).
154. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
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In summary, there are fatal documentarian objections to a regulatory ra-
tionale for the DAB Amendment. The provision of court-martial jurisdiction
over civilians exceeds the authority to regulate individuals "in" the armed
forces. It also transgresses the guarantees embodied in the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments and in Article III. The jury trial guarantee is among the most pre-
cious of those enshrined in the Constitution. The DAB Amendment cannot be
rescued from this clash by reference to the congressional power to raise armies
or to "make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
Execution [its] foregoing Powers." 5' The DAB Amendment also runs counter
to the constitutional structure of government. In particular, the DAB
Amendment violates both the separation of rulemaking from warmaking
authority and the separation of civilian from martial courts.
CONCLUSION
The problem of contractor discipline is grave, but the constitutional objec-
tions to the latest policy response are graver. The extension of military jurisdic-
tion over accompanying civilians cannot be justified by reference to the con-
gressional War Powers because contingency operations cannot constitutionally
substitute for wars. The Constitution makes war an extraordinary event, so des-
ignated by the exclusive provision of the elected representatives of the people.
No military mission can rise to this status without a congressional declaration.
Frequent diplomatic and relief operations fall especially short. Certainly, the
unilateral action of the Secretary of Defense cannot substitute for deliberative
congressional action to invoke the War Powers. A War Powers rationale for the
DAB Amendment transgresses this constitutional limitation; it would allow the
Secretary to claim the authority of the Congress for the military. On that rea-
soning, the military could court-martial accompanying civilians not in time of
war but "in time of whenever the Secretary says."
The expansion of military jurisdiction also exceeds Congress's Article I,
Section 8, Clause 14 authority to regulate the armed forces. By its terms, the
Rulemaking Power only permits Congress to regulate the forces, and accompa-
nying civilians historically have been considered as serving with, not in, the
forces. Furthermore, a reading of the Rulemaking Power to permit the DAB
Amendment brings that provision into conflict with the jury trial guarantee. It
is the former that must yield. The Constitution cannot abide a congressional
authority to implicate the jury trial right by mere rulemaking or at the sole dis-
cretion of a single executive appointee. The Rulemaking Power rationale also
confronts serious structural problems of which the most intractable is that it ef-
fectively equates peacetime and wartime police powers over accompanying ci-
vilians. It thus enables Congress to abridge civil liberties that it otherwise could
not and upsets the constitutional division of military authorities among the co-
ordinate branches. The provision by the DAB Amendment of concurrent court-
martial and civilian jurisdiction also precipitates a structural conflict between
155. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, c. i8.
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the Rulemaking Power and the Article III judicial power. Altogether, a Rule-
making Power rationale for the DAB Amendment violates the constitutional
principle of subordinating the military to civilian authority.
This Note is a comprehensive documentarian case against the DAB
Amendment. It contends not only that there is no constitutional basis for such
extraordinary power but also that such overreaching transgresses multiple Con-
stitutional provisions, diverges from historical practices and understandings,
and upsets the balance of power among the co-ordinate branches of the federal
government. It complements doctrinal objections to the DAB Amendment and
heightens the fragility of the DAB Amendment.'56 These objections suggest that
the provision of military jurisdiction over civilians supporting contingency op-
erations is constitutionally unsound.
In light of these objections, improved departmental use of the MEJA may
offer a better solution, at least for now, to the contractor accountability prob-
lem. Although shortcomings inherent in the MEJA may make it unlikely to
provide a complete remedy, improved use of the federal criminal law may ad-
dress part of the problem. That there have been so few MEJA prosecutions sug-
gests that the statute is currently underused. At the very least, the MEJA solu-
tion avoids the grave constitutional difficulties that the DAB Amendment
confronts.
156. Jackson, supra note 8.
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